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This research paper analysed the transitional justice discourses of the 
government, its political opposition, the FARC, and the civil society 
participants in the peace negotiation, and its particular understandings of peace 
and conflict in the context of the peace negotiation with FARC in Colombia. 
Based on the study of the competing discourses and how are they reflected in 
the mechanism to admin transitional justice – Special Jurisdiction of Peace – I 
argue that the mechanism definition has been part of a bargain between elites 
looking for the status quo preservation. Thus, the Special Jurisdiction of Peace 
privileges the governments' discourses, especially of the government in power, 
while excluding some of the demands from civil society representatives and 
FARC. 
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Transitional justice in Colombia1 
competing discourses in a peace agreement context 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the research problem 
The concept of transitional justice was introduced in Colombia almost 15 years 
ago as part of the peace-building framework. Since then, diverse 
understandings, representations, and discourses of transitional justice have 
informed the decisions that have been made to deal with the country’s violent 
past and present. This is especially the case in the academic and governmental 
spheres, and more recently in civil society organizations.  
War and peace are not only a matter of arms but also about words. The 
discursive arena on war and peace can successfully justify the mobilization of 
fighters or the international support for a certain war, and in the same sense, 
peace discourses are often heavily contested (Frerks, 2013: 19).  
Transitional justice alternatives, such as mechanisms to transition from a 
conflict to a post-conflict scenario, are also part of similar discursive 
constructions and contestations. Although the concept of transitional justice 
has often been portrayed as technical, neutral or apolitical, it is not. If, 
following Foucault, we understand discourse as a social practice, 
conceptualizations and definitions of reality are part of socio-historically and 
politically embedded constructions even when they are represented as objective 
and politically neutral (Frerks and Klem, 2005: 3).  
In that sense, applying the discursive approach to peace and conflict 
research allows us to explain how certain perceptions of reality shape 
discourses, and also how the discourses construct and deconstruct reality. 
Behind any transitional justice program, there are assumptions and 
presumptions that have a direct effect on post-conflict strategies (Bacchi, 2009: 
xiv) because they inform strategies, policies and practices of justice.  
This research thus starts from the assumption that discourses have 
material effects, and subsequently that discourses on justice shape justice 
strategies and institutions. As justice is understood as one of the key elements 
of peace in Colombia, discourses on justice are an important part of building a 
peaceful post-conflict society. Transitional justice mechanisms, such as the 
Special Jurisdiction of Peace, have been created in order to prosecute war 
                                                 
1 Thanks to my parents Diana and Arturo and my sisters Karen and Catalina for been 
always my unconditional support. I want to thank my supervisor Dubravka Zarkov 
for encouraging me to do my best, to Silke Heumann for helping me to shape the first 
steps of this research, and to Karin Arts for her valuable comments. I am also grateful 
with all the support received from my ISS family, special thanks to Miguel López for 
guiding me through the international law field, and to Angélica Aparicio for her 
company and advice.   
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crimes and human rights violations, and are a mutually accepted part of the 
peace negotiation process between the Colombian government and the FARC 
guerrillas. As a consequence, questions concerning who will be prosecuted and 
how; what exactly constitutes a crime worthy of prosecution, and who will be 
judged as perpetrators and who as victims are all crucial questions, not just 
discursively, but in the daily lives of Colombians who have lived through war, 
fought in war, supported war, benefited from war, and suffered because of 
war. 
There are equally important questions pertaining to whom the actors are 
that have the power to answer those questions, the ideas that shape their 
answers, and how their answers will shape the future of Colombia. While this 
last question is beyond the scope of this research, this research paper does 
focus on the key actors and their relationships with the key concepts of 
transitional justice. Following the peace process negotiations between 2012 and 
2016, I define the key actors as the government and its political opposition, the 
FARC, and the civil society. The key concepts embedded in the peace process 
that are shaping the main ideas about transitional justice are: justice, peace and 
conflict. This research will examine how each of the actors understands and 
relates to these concepts, keeping in mind that they are currently shaping the 
post-conflict peacebuilding strategies, mechanisms and institutions.  
The debate about peace and justice started in negotiations that were led by 
the FARC and the Government and attended by participants from across civil 
society. It was from these negotiations that the initial ideas to create the first 
version of the transitional justice mechanisms emerged. The discussions have 
continued since the peace agreement was signed in 2016 and, in the last two 
years, numerous shifts have seen the introduction of new conceptualizations of 
justice and the transitional justice system.  Political leaders opposing the peace 
process have been the most open proponents of these new ideas about justice 
and peace.  These shifts indicate specific understandings about the violent 
conflict in Colombia and its victims, as well as about how the transition from 
conflict to peace should occur. Their ideas, and the institutions and 
mechanisms that would be built upon them, are seen by some observers and 
actors as a threat to existing peace-building strategies that could ultimately 
jeopardize the achievements of the peace process (Uprimny, 2018).  
Applying a discourse analysis approach will enable me to study the 
understandings behind the competitive discourses on transitional justice in the 
post-peace agreement context in Colombia, and to examine the extent to 
which these discourses are part of the Special Jurisdiction of Peace mechanism. 
Therefore, rather than examining the legal provisions contained in the 
transitional justice section of the peace agreement, this research focuses on the 
meanings of basic concepts that the key actors relate to transitional justice - i.e. 
justice, peace, and conflict.  
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1.2 Research questions 
Main research question  
What are the understandings of transitional justice that are offered by the key 
actors of the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia, and how are they reflected in 
the Special Jurisdiction of Peace mechanism?   
 
Sub-questions  
 How do the key actors define justice?  
 What ideas about conflict and peace inform these definitions of 
justice?   
 What are the similarities and differences between the key actors’ 
approaches to justice?  
 How are competing discourses on transitional justice reflected in 
the Special Jurisdiction of Peace?  
1.3 Context 
Since 1980, successive Colombian Governments have negotiated the 
disarmament of armed groups. However, it was not until the beginning of the 
XXI century that transitional justice (TJ) appeared as a concept in the judicial 
and political arena. The term has become common in debates about the end of 
one of the oldest conflicts in Latin America. In general terms, it could be said 
that TJ experiences in Colombia have focused more on the judiciary 
framework to prosecute an ex-combatants than on essential social justice 
claims (Sánchez, 2017: 13).  
Colombia has a long history of peace negotiations with numerous and 
diverse armed groups. From 1989 to 1991, the Colombian government signed 
peace agreements with four guerrilla groups: the urban group M-19, the 
Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the indigenous guerrilla group known as 
Quintín Lame, and the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT). In 1994, the same 
happened with the Socialist Renewal Current, an ELN dissident group.  
The accords were based on incentives for the mass disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration of guerrilla members. The legal framework 
offered amnesty as part of its criminal procedure, and pardons for the 
insurgent groups, whilst providing some of its leaders with the possibility to 
participate in the national constitutional assembly of 1991 that redrafted a new 
constitution (Velásquez, 2018: 53).  
Transitional justice as a concept was introduced in 2003, when then-
president Álvaro Uribe Vélez formalised a secret round of negotiations to 
secure the disarmament of the United Colombian Self-Defense forces (AUC), 
the largest paramilitary federation in the country. The AUC demobilised in 
stages, starting in 2003 and finishing in 2006, a process that resulted in 37 AUC 
groups disarming. Uribe’s government proposed an alternative sentencing law 
that offered amnesty to all demobilised armed actors, including the paramilitary 
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commanders that were responsible for human rights violations (Laplante and 
Theidon, 2006: 77).   
This proposal was strongly criticised by both international and domestic 
advocates, who demanded judicial accountability and respect for the victims’ 
rights (Rowen 2017: 630). The Government was therefore forced to change 
the judicial framework to prosecute paramilitary crimes, and did so with the 
advice of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (Rowen 2017: 
630). What resulted was a paradoxical shift wherein the government and the 
paramilitary leaders went from rejecting any option other than complete 
amnesty to supporting the so-called Justice and Peace Law. Their new 
argument stated that it was necessary to find a balance between peace and 
justice, and also to recognise victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparations 
(Uprimny and Saffon 2008: 174).   
In 2006, the Constitutional Court, which included the obligation for ex-
combatants to repay their victims and to tell the truth, approved the creation 
of an entirely new penal process to prosecute ex-combatants (Rowen 2017: 
630). In exchange for providing voluntary confessions for their crimes, 
disclosure of all of their assets to repay their victims, and a promise not to 
return to illegal activity, the alternative judicial process gave paramilitary and 
guerrilla fighters sentences of five to eight years. Furthermore, the ex-
combatants that were not accused of crimes against humanity or war crimes, 
were given the possibility of obtaining amnesty if they went through a 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program (Rúa, 2015: 
82).  
The academic and political sector strongly criticised the elaboration, 
implementation and development of the Justice and Peace Law. Uribe’s 
government was accused of instrumentalising transitional justice discourse 
according to their own interests, and creating a law that used the rhetoric of 
the truth, justice and reparation to promote impunity (Uprimny and Saffon 
2008: 177) and benefit the perpetrators and not to the victims (Rúa, 2015: 82).  
In the eight years since the law was approved, only 14 sentences have been 
passed, which suggests that the Law has not fulfilled its formal aspirations of 
reparation (Velásquez, 2018: 58). Other critics have pointed out that TJ was a 
foreign idea brought to Colombia by transnational advocates that would be 
supported by the government, regardless of the particular political context. 
They argue that the idea was better suited for academics than for the ones who 
have worked in the field (Rowen 2017: 633).  
However, the law was also a starting point to talk about transitional justice 
and to use the categories and logic of justice to analyse the situation in 
Colombia (Uprimny and Saffon 2008: 171). It showed the necessity of re-
thinking strategies for investigating all of the actors involved in all the human 
rights violations over 50 years of armed conflict that would not overburden the 
judicial system (Sánchez et al., 2016: 258). 
Furthermore, the confessions during the Justice and Peace Law processes 
exposed the links between paramilitary expansion, massive land grabbing and 
forced displacement that some academics and civil society organisations had 
been reporting about for some time ( Salinas and Zarama, 2012). They gave a 
glimpse into the complex relationship between the paramilitaries and some 
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economic elites who benefited from the armed conflict. A review of academic 
literature showed that in the 35 sentences passed by this jurisdiction before 
2015, 349 cases of corporate complicity in land-grabbing and with 
paramilitaries were mentioned (Marín and Bernal, 2018: 47). 
 
Victims and Land Restitution Law  
In 2011, the Government of President Juan Manuel Santos enacted the 
Victims Reparation and Land Restitution Law, popularly referred to as 
Victims’ Law, as part of the transitional justice framework in Colombia. The 
new legislation provided financial reparations for the victims and the 
restitution of dispossessed land. Before this point, the victims' reparations were 
conceived from the position of judicial responsibility, rather than from a 
holistic standpoint that accounted for international standards (Rúa, 2015: 88). 
The Victims’ Law indicated a break from Uribe’s government in the sense that 
it acknowledged the existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia, and 
that some state agents were also guilty of human rights violations (Rúa, 2015: 
87).  
Some critics have said that the challenge of ensuring justice for more than 
8 million people is more complicated than the Victims’ Law recognises. 
According to Jamie Rebecca Rowen (2017: 642), the notion of ‘transitional’ in 
this bill suggests that the compensation would be finite, and that its perception 
of justice is short-sighted. Rowen argues that the idea of transitional justice 
continues circulating in Colombia “because the government has been able to 
craft an understanding of transitional justice that fits its needs. Rather than 
signalling radical political change, the idea of transitional justice has helped the 
government to provide a temporary solution for Colombia's ongoing conflict” 
(Rowen 2017: 642). 
 
Peace process with FARC  
On 18 October 2012, at a public event in Oslo, the Colombian Government 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) sat at the 
negotiating table to officially open a peace process would take place over the 
next four years in La Havana, Cuba (FIP, 2016a). From the beginning of the 
conversation, President Santos made it clear that the Government would only 
negotiate the end of the conflict and the establishment of a lasting peace, and 
not the country’s economic, political and social systems (Jaramillo, 2013: 3).  
The parties agreed to divide the conversation into cycles that would 
provide the structure of the six chapters of the final agreement. The six 
chapters were: agrarian development, political participation, ceasefire and 
FARC's reintegration process; solutions to the illegal drugs problem, victims’ 
rights, and implementation (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016a: 7–
9). The fifth point, also known as the ‘victims’ rights agreement’, was based on 
a human rights perspective that recognised that many different actors were 
responsible for the armed conflict in Colombia, not just the FARC and the 
state (Pabon and De Gamboa, 2018: 68). Within this section, the 
“Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence” 
combines judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms to prosecute severe violations 
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of human rights and infringements of international humanitarian law in order 
to clarify the truth of what happened during the conflict, repay the victims, and 
search for the disappeared. The Comprehensive System is composed of: The 
Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission, The Special Unit for 
the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing in the Context of and due to the 
Armed Conflict, and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Gobierno de Colombia 
and FARC-EP, 2016a: 9). 
The Special Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP in Spanish), which is the focus of 
this research, is the judicial component of the comprehensive system. The 
purpose of the JEP is to administer transitional justice to the gravest and most 
significant crimes with important contextual implications in the conflict before  
December 1st 2016 (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, n.d.). 
In June 2016, before starting to negotiate points pertaining to victims’ 
rights, the Government and FARC released a public statement stating that the 
agreement was to be centred around the compensation of the victims, as well 
as announcing three new participation mechanisms. The first was the creation 
of the Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims, a diverse group 
of experts chosen by both negotiating parties that presented a document 
containing arguments about the causes of and reasons for the continuation of 
the conflict, and its effects on Colombia, from various perspectives. Secondly, 
four regional discussion forums were established in Villavicencio, 
Barrancabermeja, Barranquilla, and Cali to reflect upon the fifth point of the 
negotiation agenda. The third mechanism was an invitation to a delegation of 
victims to participate at the negotiations in Havana (Brett, 2017: 89). The 60-
person delegation was divided into groups of 12 that visited the negotiating 
teams at different moments. The groups were composed of individuals that 
were selected based on the criteria of gender, the types of crime that were 
committed against them, as well as the group that perpetrated the crime 
(guerrillas, paramilitaries or the State) (2017: 27).  
Achieving the active inclusion civil society members aside from victims in 
the negotiating process was not easy and required pressure from social 
movements. This was the case for women’s organisations and indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities. When the peace talks started in 2012, women 
were not a part of either of the two negotiation teams, which reinforced the 
belief that war, as well as the ending of war, were issues for men (Céspedes-
Báez and Ruiz, 2018, p. 93). Forty women’s organizations joined forces to 
create a coalition called ‘Mujeres por la Paz’ (Women for peace) that spread 
one message: “there is no peace without women”. Mujeres por la Paz led 
numerous forums across the country and a public demonstration of 8000 
women in November 2013 that marched towards the presidential palace 
(Céspedes-Báez and Ruiz, 2018, p. 96). In response to the women’s claims, 
FARC and the Government created a sub-commission of 18 experts on gender 
and feminism experts who flew to Havana to advise on the reformulation of 
the agreement.  
Although indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities had been 
demanding participation in Havana to present their perspective for more than 
three years, they were only called to participate the day before the final 
agreement was announced. Some of the claims of Afro-Colombian and 
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indigenous leaders were included in the so-called 'ethnic chapter'(Verdad 
Abierta, 2016) .  
The Final Agreement was reached on 24 September 2016 but was rejected 
by the majority of Colombians in a plebiscite on October 2. This led to a 
renegotiation of the chapters in the agreement and further modifications 
during the endorsement process. The Special Jurisdiction of Peace faced 
several changes that will be explained in chapter 5. 
1.4 Methodological considerations 
To conduct the research, I applied a Discourse Analysis (DA) methodology 
because I believe in the potential of using DA to unpack statements that may 
appear obvious, inevitable or natural, and also using DA to explore the process 
behind constructing different meanings of ‘truth’ (Goodwin, 2013: 170).  
There are a variety of approaches to DA from multiple different schools 
across social science and policy studies. This research applies a post-structural 
approach that defines discourse “as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categories through which meaning is given to phenomena” (Gasper and 
Apthorpe, 1996: 2). The analysis of the Special Jurisdiction of Peace as a public 
policy uses post-structuralist and social-constructionist theories that 
understand policies as discourses. Under these conceptualisations, the ways 
that policies frame certain social problems and construct concepts, categories 
and subject positions, shape the world in which these policies are implemented 
(Goodwin, 2013: 170). I also find the understanding of discourse as a 
conversation, debate, and exchange to be functional; and also analysis that 
takes into different points of view and relies on intellectual exchange in policy-
making (1996: 4). This research therefore integrates contributions from 
different approaches and does not adhere to a ready-made formula based on 
invariable assumptions, which is considered by some authors a constant danger 
in DA research (1996: 2).  
According to Teun A. van Dijk, discourse can be analysed as structure, as 
process (Dijk, 1997b), and as social interaction (Dijk, 1997a). Discourses have 
three main dimensions: the use of language, communications of beliefs, and 
interaction in social situations. The challenge of discourse analysis is to 
formulate theories of the relationships between language users, beliefs, and 
interactions (Dijk, 1997b: 2).  
However, it is insufficient to explain discourse solely through its internal 
structure and its process; discourse must be studied as a practical, social and 
cultural phenomenon (Dijk, 1997a: 20). Reading discourses as a social 
interaction means that they are part of broader sociocultural structures and 
processes; meaning that language users are not only speakers but members of 
social categories such as gender, class, ethnicity, and age that play a 
fundamental role in the act of writing or speaking (Dijk, 1997a: 21). Discourse 
does not, therefore, occur in a vacuum or possess a 'meaning' by itself. It is 
produced within a specific context (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 4).  
This research is focused on the study of discourses as social 
interactions and the context is therefore guided by the local and global 
characteristics of the social functioning of the texts, rather than by a context of 
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the verbal structures (Dijk, 1997a: 14). This requires the researcher to take a 
broader perspective that shows the social, political or cultural functions of 
discourse within certain institutions and groups, as well as within society and 
culture at large (Dijk, 1997b: 5). Contrary to a ‘given’ or ‘static’ social context 
that language users and their discourses 'obey' passively in a manner 
determined by their group, societal or cultural context, understanding 
discourses as social interactions allows actors to contribute to both construct 
and challenge their social contexts (1997b: 20). This research therefore 
understands discourse as a social practice that is shaped by social situations, 
structures, institutions, and power relations, but also as a mechanism for 
producing, reproducing or disputing contexts (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 
258 in Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 5–6). 
 
Power/Knowledge in Discourse  
According to Michel Foucault, power is intrinsically connected with the 
production of truth and knowledge. The truth about everyday reality is that it is 
a construction that is kept in place through a wide range of strategies that 
privilege and normalise specific views whilst excluding others (Mills, 2003b: 
76). 
Power works through knowledge and is not possessed but exercised. 
Power/knowledge regimes produce knowledge through the institutionalised 
practices of exclusion, representation, naming, and defining, and everyday 
practices (Mills, 2003b: 69). Thus, there is no absolute truth. In the words of 
Stuart Hall, there are no fixed meanings. Instead, meaning is constructed 
through language based on context, practices and interactions; and through 
systems of representation (Hall, 1997: 25). Powerful institutions produce 
discourses of what is normal and what is true, which are accepted by the 
majority of people through the process of normalization that occurs in their 
daily practices, without the need for brute force. Those discourses, practices 
and values can also be understood as shared 'cultural codes' to understand the 
world using the same conceptual maps (Hall, 1997: 22).   
Discourses are therefore not merely a translation of reality into language, 
but “a system which structures the way that we perceive reality” (Mills, 2003a: 
55). Rather than denying the existence of material reality, Foucault’s theory 
suggests that we can only think about, experience and comprehend material 
reality based on the discourses that we share and the structures that these 
discourses impose on our thinking (2003a: 56). In other words, material reality 
and discourses are mutually constitutive. There are, however, competing and 
conflicting discourses that are linked to competing and conflicting social 
structures, institutions and struggles. There are thus ways to resist and 
transform the dominant institutional discourses as “discourse is both the 
means of oppressing and the means of resistance” (2003a: 55).  
Using such an approach to discourse, truth, power and knowledge allows 
this research to use discourse analysis as a methodology to understand how 
discourses on transitional justice have naturalised certain practices and values, 
and also how they are contested through counter-discourses.  
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1.4.1 DA Methods 
The first step to examine the competing discourses about transitional justice 
was to select three categories of analysis: peace, conflict and justice. A detailed 
reading of the Special Jurisdiction of Peace chapter in the Peace Agreement, 
made it possible to identify the centrality of those concepts in the definition of 
the new transitional justice mechanism.  
As an analytical tool, categorisation is understood as a representational 
strategy that organises everyday knowledge by classifying actors, objects and 
ideas into specific groups for the purpose of justifying past and future actions 
(Sacks, 1992 in Leudar et al., 2004: 244). Classification would therefore have a 
direct impact on any transitional justice mechanism because such mechanisms 
are concerned with dispensing justice for past and future actions. For instance, 
the legal conceptualisation of conflict defines or redefines who gets prosecuted 
and who does not. Similarly, the conceptualisation of justice determines who 
has the power to guarantee a fair judicial process or to change the provisions 
of justice. The same is true with the conceptualisations of peace and 
victimhood as classifications determine what is peace and what actions would 
bring it about; as well as who victims are and what actions produce 
victimhood.  
The tool was used to analyse the TJ mechanisms and the competing 
discourses that inform them. This is because, in this particular case, the Special 
Jurisdiction of Peace as a public policy was not solely the result of a 
Government decision, but the result of debate and discussions between a 
diverse group of actors that participated in its elaboration and execution at 
different levels.  
Therefore, the next step in my methodology was to define the four 
principal actors in peace negotiations: the Government, its political opposition, 
the FARC, and the civil society participants in the peace negotiation (i.e. 
victims, women and the Indigenous' and Afro-Colombian' leaders). The 
selection of these four actors was based on their influence in the process of 
making the Special Jurisdiction of Peace.  
An actor-orientation and constructivist approach starts with the 
recognition that realities are socially shaped and interpreted by different social 
positions, perspectives, and interests that vary between individuals and groups 
(Frerks and Klem, 2005: 2). Rather than determining the accuracy (i.e. the 
‘truthfulness’) of the discourses, the purpose is to examine how and why social 
actors arrive at their multiple and diverse understandings, interpretations and 
representations, i.e. discourses,  about reality (Frerks and Klem, 2005: 3). This 
does not mean that this research ignores the heterogeneous nature of the 
selected actors and the possibility for the co-existence of more than one 
discourse within a given actor.  
In addition to categorisation, the selected texts were analysed through the 
‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR) method. This is a framework 
developed by Carol Bacchi that is based on four academic traditions: social 
construction theory, post-structuralism, feminist body theory and 
governmentality studies (Bacchi, 2009: xv). WPR consists of six interrelated 
questions that help researchers to unravel “problem representations” in 
16 
 
policies, and the assumptions, presumptions and silences that lie behind those 
policies (Bacchi, 2009: xv).2 
 
The WPR method fits harmoniously with the post-structuralist 
assumptions that inform this research. It analyses policies as cultural products 
that give shape to 'problems' based on deep-seated cultural assumptions 
(Bacchi, 2009: x). Problems, in this sense, are not understood as troubling 
conditions, but as “the kind of change implied in a particular policy 
proposal”(Bacchi, 2009: xi). In this research, WPR allows me to focus on the 
central role that certain representations of justice, peace and conflict play in the 
transitional justice proposals made by the different actors. Furthermore, I ask 
how those representations of transitional justice are included or excluded in the 
problematization of “proper” justice to transition from a state of conflict to 
the peace contained in the Special Jurisdiction of Peace.  
In summary, I believe that the combination of WPR and categorisation 
facilitate a critical analysis of the Special Jurisdiction of Peace mechanism, and 
of the understandings of transitional justice offered by the principal actors of 
the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia. 
1.4.2 Text selection 
I started by reading all of the public statements made by the government, the 
FARC and civil society representatives regarding transitional justice that were 
contained in the Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP (OACP, 2018). 
This is an eleven-volume compilation of the most relevant public statements 
made by the various actors that was edited and published by the High 
Commission for Peace Office in Colombia (OACP). Notably, the publication 
does not contain public statements delivered by the political opposition 
regarding the peace agreement. 
To select documents for analysis, I followed Foucault’s suggestion of 
focusing on 'prescriptive texts', which expose rules, opinions and advice for 
how problems should be addressed (Focault, 1986 in Bacchi, 2009: 34). I 
prioritised speeches where the actors not only referred to transitional justice in 
general, but also included their views on what TJ should look like in a post-
agreement scenario. Other selection criteria included the time period, and I 
included speeches delivered at the beginning of the negotiation process in 
November 2012 and at the time the JEP was passed into law in November 
2017.  I also prioritized statements that displayed actors' understandings of the 
key categories for my analysis: justice, peace and conflict.  
To study FARC’s discourse on transitional justice, this research focused 
on the analysis of the three official statements released by the guerrilla peace 
delegation in Havana during their negotiations with the Government.3 Unlike 
FARC, the Government had a more diverse group of official spokespersons 
from their peace delegation. For this research I decided to only select 
statements made by Juan Manuel Santos.  
                                                 
2 The six guiding questions are summarised in the chart on Appendix 1. 
3 All analysed documents are listed in Appendix 2. 
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The discourses that were opposed to the peace process, and, more 
specifically, opposed the Special Jurisdiction of Peace, were produced by a 
variety of actors. Opposing actors included: the Conservative Party, some 
evangelical churches, the Colombian Association of Retired Military Officials, 
(ACORE), and some economic groups like the National Federation of  
Cattlemen (FEDEGAN) (Gómez, 2017: 242). However, I decided to focus on 
the statements released by the former President Álvaro Uribe and his 
Democratic Centre party, who have been in power since August 2018, because 
of their influential role in the renegotiation and modification of the Peace 
Agreements.    
For the civil society organizations and individuals, I selected official 
statements that they brought to the negotiating table and some documents that 
outlined their propositions regarding TJ. 
1.4.3 Scope and limitations 
This research is based on secondary data and the analysis is limited to the trials 
component of the transitional justice system of the peace agreement, as well as 
a reduced number of categories and actors. I am aware that empirical research 
with different actors that participated in the elaboration of the Special 
Jurisdiction of Peace would have provided a more extensive and broader 
spectrum of analysis. Furthermore, an opportunity to study more categories 
and more actors’ discourses would have enhanced the complexity of the 
research. 
My positionality in this research was influenced by my previous work as a 
journalist covering armed conflict in Colombia, and especially by my 
experience reporting on Justice and Peace Law trials. This made me more 
aware of the social power relations that underpinned the TJ discourses and the 
material effects of these on the lives of Colombia’s most vulnerable citizens. 
As a Colombian citizen, I supported the peace conversations with FARC. 
However, I do not think that this impeded my ability to provide a critical 




2   Theoretical framework 
2.1 The state of the relevant academic fields 
According to the Secretary-General office of the United Nations (UN), 
effective governing and judicial systems that respect human rights and the rule 
of law are necessary to promote reconciliation and lasting consolidated 
peace(United Nations, 2010: 3). For the UN, transitional justice is crucial for 
the establishment or re-establishment of the institutionalism, and has been 
defined as: 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-
seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof 
(United Nations, 2004: 4).  
The UN refers to mechanisms such as truth commissions, trials, 
amnesties, reparation programs, memorials, venting and lustration procedures, 
among other things that are implemented by societies during processes of 
transition and transformation (Mihr, 2017: 1). Whatever combination of 
mechanisms and procedures a government or civil society chooses, they must 
conform to international norms (United Nations, 2010: 3).   
Although policymakers, donors, and actors involved in international 
cooperation in the field of TJ have widely accepted the above definition, there 
is not a fixed meaning of the concept. In academia, there is still a debate about 
the nature and boundaries of TJ, as well as a discussion about the social 
relations of power involved in the construction of the mainstream 
understanding of transitional justice. Among scholars, TJ is generally 
understood as the measures implemented under international law to address 
large-scale and serious crimes (de Greiff, 2010: 2). Ruti Teitel, one the most 
influential scholars in the field, has defined TJ as “the conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change, characterised by legal responses to 
confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel, 2014: 
49). According to Teitel (2014: 52), the evolution of transitional justice can be 
divided into three phases. The first, 'the post-war phase', began after the end of 
World War II in 1945. The Nuremberg Trials, a symbol of this phase, took two 
precedents set in the aftermath of World War I: the predominance of 
international law over national law, and the adverse effects of the severe 
collective sanctions on Germany. These precedednts led to new liberal focus 
on individual judgement and responsibility. This first phase of transitional 
justice occurred in unique conditions that facilitated interstate cooperation, war 
crime trials, and sanctions.  
Phase II began in the aftermath of the Cold War. The decline of the 
Soviet Union, and the end of US - Soviet bipolarity had tremendous impacts 
on the southern cone of South America, Eastern Europe, and Central America.  
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Once, the question of national law vs international law was raised, and the 
result was many nation-state trials that were based on international 
jurisprudence to legitimise the new regimes and advance nation-building, 
modernisation, and the rule of law (2014: 54). The values of the rule of law 
were not only based on retributive justice anymore; peace and reconciliation 
began to be considered as part of a more complex and diverse understanding 
of the political conditions of transition. In this phase, the TJ aim was to unveil 
an alternative truth about past violations, which led to the rise of the justice vs 
truth debate and the emergence of Truth Commissions in different parts of the 
world (Teitel, 2014: 55).  
The third “steady-state” phase started at the end of the 20th century and 
continues to this day. It is associated with the expansion and normalisation of 
transitional justice;. What was once an exception became the new norm. The 
principal symbol of this stage is the International Criminal Court (ICC), created 
in 1998 to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity under 
international law. The ICC was ratified by 123 countries that are signatories to 
the Rome Statute (ICC, n.d.). According to Teitel (2014: 65), there are many 
new dilemmas brought about by the expansion of the law of war. This includes 
the establishment of a humanitarian law that serves the broader purpose of 
regulating the conduct in war, which contributed to the foundations of an 
emerging law on terrorism.  
 
Transitional justice as globalized agenda  
The globalisation of TJ created a new scenario where the dichotomy between 
peace and justice was dismissed by international organizations because of the 
new consensus that a lasting peace would not be possible without grievances 
being addressed first (Kent, 2017: 204). In the 2004 UN Secretary-General 
report, Kofi Annan pointed out “Justice and peace are not contradictory 
forces. Rather, properly pursued, they promote and sustain one another” 
(United Nations, 2004: 8). Thus, blank amnesties or 'forgive and forget' 
policies, as there were in the post- Cold War phase, are no longer suitable for 
the new accountability standards (Fijalkowski, 2017: 116), and cannot be 
applied to signatories of the Rome Statute. In the words of Rosemary Nagy, 
this is a 'global project' in which “the question today is not whether something 
should be done after an atrocity but how it should be done” (Nagy, 2008).  
A leading view put forward by this approach understands transitional 
justice as being associated with a specific set of mechanisms, closer to the UN 
definition. For example, Pablo de Greiff4 argues that despite the disagreements 
about the boundaries of the concept and its implementation, there is a 
consensus regarding the minimal core elements that transitional policies must 
have: “prosecutions, truth-telling measures, reparations for victims, and some 
initiatives tending towards institutional reform, particularly the vetting of 
security sector personnel. Other elements frequently said to be parts of 
transitional justice include memorialization efforts as well as local justice 
                                                 
4 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation 
and guarantees of non-recurrence and former Director of Research at the ICTJ. 
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initiatives” (Greiff, 2010: 2). However, this approach has been criticised for its 
“top-down” application and its “one-size-fits-all” approach (Sharp, 2014: 9).   
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), an NGO that is 
advising on transitional justice initiatives in more than 20 countries, describes 
four main strategies for dealing with massive violations: prosecution, truth-
seeking, reparations, and institutional reform (ICTJ, 2011b).  This approach 
was inspired by the holistic model, proposed by the co-founder of the ICTJ, 
Alex Boraine and provides five essential pillars for transitional justice. They 
are: 1) retributive sanctions to those deemed responsible for human rights 
violations, 2) truth recuperation, 3) reconciliation processes that include the 
reintegration of ex-combatants, 4) non-repetition guarantees and 5) reparations 
(Boraine, 2006). This is the model that has been most popular among policy-
makers, scholars, and TJ practitioners in Colombia (Sánchez, 2017: 29).   
According to Dustin Sharp (2014: 3), another problem is that for the last 
30 years ‘transition’ has been assumed to mean the transition to a Western-style 
liberal market democracy. Although today’s TJ field is increasingly 
interdisciplinary, most of the debates are still narrow and thin, focused on 
human rights, legalisms, and political science domains that do not problematise 
the idea of the liberal peace (Sharp, 2014: 7). Similarly, Zinaida Miller (2008: 
272) refers to the close relationship between policymakers and scholars as 
creating a ‘snowball effect’ that does not provide a critical examination of the 
international actors and the social relations of power involved in the 
understanding of TJ. 
 
Critical perspective: assumptions and silences of TJ  
In recent years, critiques of conceptualizations of TJ have increased as the field 
has aged and matured. Scholars and practitioners are calling for broader 
agendas and the reframing of the concept (Bell, 2008: 13). The expansion has 
been reflected in more inclusive and complex approaches that have brought 
new scopes, methodologies, and actors into consideration. For instance, recent 
works in the field have been demanding a more participatory approach and less 
top-down interventions (Lundy and McGovern, 2008); more reflections on 
what transition means and how to understand it within violent democratic 
societies (Ni Aolain and Campbell, 2005); questioning the capacity of 
traditional TJ mechanisms to contribute to and/or obstruct accountability for 
human rights violations (Skaar et al., 2016); including more critical analyses of 
gendered justice gaps (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2017), and 
studying the inclusion of local justice practices as a responce to transitional 
justice aims (Clark, 2007).  
I have focused on some scholars who are critically examining the 
understandings of transitional justice as a discourse and practice and exploring 
the assumptions, silences, and social relations of power involved in the 
construction of the concept.  
Nagy (2008: 277–278), for instance, insists that the focus on the set of 
mechanisms outlined in the dominant approaches of TJ has resulted in a 
narrow understanding of violence and transitional responses to it. She claims 
that trials and truth commissions have structured their conceptions of violence 
and justice based on the assumption that a focus on legal processes will 
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provide the best solutions for dealing with social harm, an assumption that 
implicitly privileges liberal democratic ideals. Nagy (2008: 287) argues that 
because transitional justice is a discourse and a practice embedded in power 
relations, the same is true for its definitions of who is accountable for what, 
where and when. It is a one-size-fits-all discourse focused on massive 
violations of human rights that tends to ignore structural violence, gender 
inequality, and foreign involvement in its understanding of violence. 
Likewise, Miller (2008: 266) argues that the transitional justice project’s 
narrations on peace and conflict may perpetuate silences and invisibilities 
wherein physical atrocities are seen as intolerable while structural violence is 
accepted. According to Miller, TJ actors and practitioners hardly ever mention 
social exclusion, economic rights, redistribution, and development, and when 
these factors are mentioned, they tend to remain as a part of the contextual 
background.  More specifically, the TJ literature fails to explore the economic 
causes and consequences of conflict, the liberal economic ideas that inform 
transitions based on liberal peace assumptions, and the government 
development plans that accompany the transition process (Miller, 2008: 267).  
In this sense, Miller (2008: 267) disputes the idea of false neutrality and 
transitional justice’s apolitical legal mechanisms. The mainstream TJ concept 
already holds political positions regarding inequity, redistribution, and 
development. The problem is that seen through this lens, the narrative of 
conflicts become political and unidimensional. Two examples include: the 
aftermath of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
where the story of apartheid focused on racism and individual violations and 
not on the story of an economic-colonial project that created a system of 
abuses; and the fact that the Rwanda genocide become a story of 'ethnic 
hatred' rather than understood to be a consequence of colonial constructions 
that perpetuated the unequal distribution of resources (2008: 281). 
Sharp (2014: 9) argues that TJ narratives are grounded in neutral, technical 
and, apolitical language in accordance with the human rights discourses that 
veil the political assumptions and purposes of the TJ project (Sharp, 2014: 9). 
He also agrees that the TJ consensus to 'do something' is entirely focused on 
large-scale human rights atrocities and physical violence, and ignores the issue 
of economic rights (2014: 2). This is partly a consequence of the early 
construction of a field where the notion of transition was conceived of in 
relation to Western liberal market conceptions of democracy and the rule of 
law. 
 TJ discourse and practice have material effects. Going back to the TRC, 
Sharp explains that the Commission limited the category of victim to focusing 
on individuals that suffered violations of their human rights, which 
consequently meant that the structural injustices of apartheid itself remained 
unaddressed in the background. As a result, “two decades since the end of 
white rule in South Africa, apartheid has ended, but the de facto economic and 
social status quo has not changed to the degree many would have hoped” 
(Sharp, 2014: 11). Based on this, the author proposes that the notion of 
transition in TJ should be reconceptualised and reoriented from a transition to 





Some scholars have received the inclusion of social-economic issues as 
part of the conceptualisation of TJ with scepticism. Lars Waldorf (2012: 179) 
does not deny the importance that recognising social-economic inequalities 
plays in preventing future conflict, but insists that the short-term, legal and 
corrective nature of transitional justice means it is unrealistic to expect it to 
resolve these issues. Waldorf argues instead that this can be achieved through 
democratic policies. De Greiff (2010: 40–41) argues that adding economic 
crimes to the duties of trials and truth commissions could overburden the 
transitional justice process and create broad opposition from the economic 
elites.  
Rather than refuting these issues, the UN attempted to incorporate some 
of them into its understanding of TJ. In 2006, Louise Arbour,  the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that:  
Transitional justice must have the ambition of assisting the transformation of 
oppressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through 
measures that will procure an equitable future. It must reach to, but also beyond 
the crises and abuses committed during the conflict which led to the transition, 
into the human rights violations that pre-existed the conflict and caused, or 
contributed to it. When making that search, it is likely that one would expose a 
great number of violations of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights and 
discriminatory practices (Arbour, 2006: 3–4).  
However, as Lekha Sriram argues, as long as transitional processes remain 
embedded in a peacebuilding framework that promotes free markets and 
democracy, it is unlikely that socioeconomic issues will be taken into account 
(Sriram, 2014: 28). The evident danger for Sriram “is that promoting 
marketisation without dealing with past grievances over inequitable resource 
distribution may lead to the revival of old grievances or create new ones” 
(2014: 24). 
2.2 Theoretical perspectives of this research 
In this research, I focus on the critical theoretical perspectives on transitional 
justice mentioned above.  I start with the conception of TJ as discourse and as 
a practice that has material effects on society. As Nagy (2008: 291) argues, “the 
institutions of transitional justice are, at base, definitional. They serve not only 
to delineate past and future but also to define violation and crime, victims and 
perpetrators, injustice and morality. They demarcate the boundaries of 
acceptable demands by a citizenry newly awarded its rights and narrate 
themselves as instruments of justice, political will, stability and peace”.  
Secondly, my hypothesis that the foundations of the Colombian peace 
process with FARC (2012-2016) are based on the mainstream understanding of 
transitional justice as part of the liberal peacebuilding agenda is a critical 
perspective that allows me to unpack the assumptions and silences behind the 
Special Jurisdiction on Peace.  
Thirdly, I emphasise the social relations of power involved in the 
definition of a TJ process. In 1986, Guillermo O’Donnell and Samuel 
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Huntington, quoted by some of the critical perspective scholars, 
emphasized that TJ is the result of a series of bargains between elite groups 
based on their interests, and that the level of justice is dependent on which elite 
perpetrator groups dictate the terms of the transition (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986 in Paige, 2009: 346).  
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3   What justice means? 
3.1 Special jurisdiction of peace’s debate 
For the first time in Colombian history, the design of transitional justice 
mechanisms became part of the peace process agenda. In 2012, the 
Government created the Legal Framework for Peace in an attempt to translate 
the international standards on transitional justice into the Colombian 
Constitution. However, the proposition was rejected by FARC during 
negotiations (Semana, 2013). Furthermore, as explained earlier in the context 
section, some representatives of the civil society participated in the discussion 
about the TJ model.   
The most charged discussion was the definition of the judiciary 
mechanism to investigate, prosecute, and sanction against crimes against 
humanity and other violations to the international humanitarian law (IHL) 
(Gómez, 2017: 240). Total amnesties were not an option as they were in 
previous peace processes because Colombia was both a signatory to the Rome 
Statute and a country under preliminary examination by the ICC (Uprimny et 
al., 2014: 13).  
Peace negotiations with FARC were framed under the globalization, or 
phase III stage of TJ (Teitel, 2003). This provided the TJ debate with four 
particular characteristics: a transition beyond the justice vs peace debate; more 
monitoring by international courts such as the ICC and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR); stronger demands of no-impunity in terms 
of truth, justice, and reparations from different actors; and political dissensions 
being ‘translated’ into judiciary disputes (Uprimny et al., 2014: 15).  
The controversy focused on the questions of what may be sanctioned, 
who may be prosecuted, and how.  Despite the use of legal and seemingly 
neutral vocabulary, the debate became politicised: “The meaning of transitional 
justice continues to evolve in Colombia. While an analysis of the Justice and 
Peace Law reveals how different actors first instrumentalised transitional 
justice, the peace process with FARC highlights how politicised the idea has 
become” (Rowen J.R., 2017: 641).   
In September 2015, the FARC and the Government announced the 
creation of a Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) that will be charged with 
taking “decisions that offer full legal certainty to those who participated 
directly or indirectly in the internal armed conflict with regard to acts 
committed in the context of and during said conflict and which represent 
serious breaches of international humanitarian law and serious violations of 








3.2 FARC’s understanding of justice 
An overview of the FARC’s discourse related to transitional justice during the 
negotiation process reveals changes in the conceptualization of justice within 
the transition context. For instance, at the beginning of the peace talks and 
because of their political nature, FARC claimed amnesties and transitional 
justice based on a truth commission. However, by the end of the negotiations 
they started to accept the necessity of a judicial process.  Furthermore, the 
third document analysed here shows how FARC adopted some of the 
Government’s arguments and strategies, such as highlighting the benefits of a 
peace based on truth, justice, reparations and no repetition, as well as 
redistributive justice being the best possible solution (FARC-EP, 2018c: 523). 
However, in general terms, there has been no significant shift in FARC’s 
conceptualisation of the categories. They upheld the essence of their demands 
throughout all of the conferences and the previous peace processes. FARC 
have always argued that a disarmament agreement is not a peace agreement if 
there is no change in the structural causes of the violence. The structural 
causes include: inequality in land distribution, the lack of guarantees for their 
participation in politics, and more recently, the need to find a solution to both 
the paramilitary and the drug trafficking economies (Medina, 2009: 202). 
According to FARC, the justice system is partly responsible for the 
reproduction of violence because it is founded on a 'criminal law of the enemy' 
that has obscured the state’s responsibility for the conflict, while imprisoning 
innocent people and political opponents.  Thus, in a transitional scenario, the 
new TJ mechanisms to judge FARC cannot be part of a justice branch that 
they feel has been politicised (FARC-EP, 2018a: 230). This justice system, 
according to FARC, must be centred on the truth because they see truth as the 
most important mechanism to heal victims: “Without truth reconciliation is 
not possible. The Truth must mark the only way to rebuild Colombian society 
after years of confrontation (...)”(2018a, p. 226) [Translation by TN].5 It could 
be said, then, that FARC put more effort into truth initiatives than the judicial 
process. 
However, the question of ‘what kind of truth?’ remains. FARC is focused 
on the truth about the structural causes that have caused and perpetuated 
conflict in Colombia since the 1930s. They are looking to find the 'real truth' 
about the roots of the conflict in order to undermine the ‘false’ conflict 
narrative being spread by the Government.  It is a conceptualisation of truth 
that is more characteristic of Phase II of TJ from after the fall of the 
dictatorships on the southern cone of America, where transitional justice 
processes focused on the construction of an alternative history of past abuses 
(Teitel, 2003: 55). Victims, defined as political agents leading mobilization 
processes, must participate in the transitional justice process, as well as in the 
construction of truth; and their reports need to be heard. Furthermore, it could 
be said that FARC’s discourses are more focused on a historical side of ‘the 
truth’ than on immediate concerns such as the locations for the burials of the 
                                                 
5 Quotes translated by the author from Spanish to English. 
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dead, and information about the disappeared, which are both truths that 
victims' organisations have been asking for. 
FARC argues that all the actors must be part of the transitional system in a 
future tribunal, and contributors to the Truth Commission. A transitional 
justice system should also reach and even-handedly prosecute civilians involved 
in the conflict instead of only combatants (FARC-EP, 2018b). This is 
especially the case for, the civil heads of the state, corporations, and 
landowners that financed armed groups. All of those actors must engage with 
the process of victim reparations according to the types of victimisation they 
were responsible for. However, as the head of the dominant and exploitative 
regime, the state must accept the primary responsibility in a judiciary process 
and should be in charge of the financial reparations to the victims.  
This also leads to a broader notion of who the victims are.  If more actors 
recognise their responsibility, more victims can be included.  For instance, 
FARC would recognise victims of the economic system, victims of foreign 
interference, victims of extrajudicial executions, and political prisoners as 
victims of the conflict. 
FARC firmly demands amnesty for political crimes (i.e. crimes related to 
their political activities that cannot in any case lead to a custodial sanction). 
Also, because they recognise themselves as a political organisation that fought 
collectively, they do not want to be tried as individuals.  
Finally, because injustice is only one of the causes of systemic violence, a 
new transitional justice system is not going to work if the other structural 
causes of violence, such as unequal land distribution, or the lack of guarantees 
for political participation do not change. So, while the legal aspects of justice 
are important for FARC, they do not see them as enough to achieve social 
justice and reconciliation.  
3.3 Government’s competing understandings of justice 
During both the plebiscite campaign in 2016 and the aftermath of the peace 
agreement’s rejection in the plebiscite, the Special Jurisdiction of Peace debate 
has been framed as part of a polarised political confrontation between two 
former allies: the administration of then President Santos, and the Democratic 
Centre Party led by former president Uribe (FIP, 2016b). This is a narrow 
conceptualization that has prioritised the powerful actors and ignored a range 
of other competing actors and discourses.   
Indeed, the Governmental discourses have things in common. Both start 
from a mainstream liberal conceptualisation of peace as a means for promoting 
democracy and free markets, with a focus on massive human rights violations 
that exclude economic violence (Sharp, 2014: 28). Therefore, neither of the 
discourses problematized neoliberal economic practices and development 
plans as roots of the conflict and as possible causes of new violence (Miller, 
2008: 267). Both approaches ignored structural violence, gender inequality, and 





Santos administration’s discourse  
Based on the analysis, it could be said that the Santos administration’s 
discourse on transitional justice is a translation of the so-called TJ ‘global 
project’ (Nagy, 2008: 276), with ICTJ’s advice “at the heart of the peace 
negotiations”(ICTJ, 2011a). Supported by international legal standards and 
drafted in technical and apolitical vocabulary, the Government suggested a 
“holistic”, “victim-oriented” TJ process to enhance prosecutions, truth-
seeking, reparations, and some institutional reforms.  
The then President Juan Manuel Santos argued that transitional justice 
required the deployment of the necessary mechanisms to achieve justice in 
times of transition from armed conflict to peace (Santos, 2018c). Therefore, 
transitional justice is the cornerstone of the process because it is called to lead 
to the end of the conflict with the satisfaction of victims' rights in a transitional 
scenario wherein the victims would be unafraid to speak up and the victimisers 
would be incentivised to accept their crimes. Rather than a ‘justice or peace’ 
dichotomy, Santos insisted that the agreement would attempt to achieve a 
peace with the highest standards of justice (Santos, 2018b: 467). Justice must 
therefore enforce national and international regulations, (i.e. the Constitution, 
the Rome Statute and the ICC guidelines) to prosecute war crimes, and 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law:  
The guerrilla told us: “We would be the only guerrilla that put aside its weapons 
to go to prison and we will not accept that”. We responded: “We understand that 
position, but you have committed crimes, some crimes that are listed in national 
and international jurisprudence, and the country simply cannot, as it was done in 
the past, offer a blank amnesty”.  Here we do not forget everything that 
happened, because where are the rights of the victims, the rights to the truth, the 
rights to reparation, the rights to justice? (Santos, 2018b: 467) [Translation by 
TN]. 
There is an emphasis on the international community as a witness of the 
process: “Colombian peace is also the peace of the continent and, therefore, 
the whole world has its eyes on us. What we will or will not do resonates far 
beyond our borders” (Santos, 2018a: 137).  
Furthermore, similar to FARC, the Government believed that the Special 
Jurisdiction of Peace should not solely be designed for former guerrilla 
members. Since the beginning of the peace process, Santos promised that 
military members and other prosecuted state agents would receive the same 
judiciary benefits as FARC: “There will be no special treatment of justice for 
the FARC if there is not - at the same time - a differentiated treatment, but 
simultaneous, equitable and symmetrical, for our military and police” (Santos, 
2018a: 524) [Translation by TN]. That does not mean that they were 
considered as equals in the eyes of the Government. The same logic was 
applied to the civilians that actively participated in the conflict. However, the 
President has always made it clear that civilians who participated in the conflict 
as a result of coercion were innocent and that peace would not be a 'witch-
hunt' of companies.   
According to the Government, Colombia could only move forward as a 
society if it satisfied victims' rights. Victims’ rights have therefore been at the 
centre of a number of public policies led by the Santos administration (Santos, 
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2018c), such as the promotion of the 2011 Victims’ Law. The ‘victim-centred’ 
or the ‘victim-oriented’ perspective claim for restorative justice and victims’ 
rights to truth, an approach increasingly taken in the recent TJ literature, has 
criticized by some scholars for its lack of reflection upon what victims’ rights 
actually means (Sriram and García-Godos, 2013: 5).  
Supported by international legal standards, the Government defined the 
victims’ rights that needed to be satisfied: truth, justice, reparation, and non-
repetition. In the same normative discourse, a victim is a person or collective 
that suffered damages as a consequence of human rights or IHL violations in 
the context of the conflict (UARIV, n.d.).  Santos portrayed victims as 
benevolent human beings looking for a specific kind of truth; a homogeneous 
group with a shared suffering, who were supportive of the peace agreement in 
order to avoid future victimisation:  
If you ask the victims what their main demand is, it is not the money, it is not the 
land, much less the revenge (…) For the most part, victims want, in the first 
place, to be recognized.  They want to know what happened to them and find 
out what happened to their loved ones (Santos, 2018b, p. 114) [Translation by 
TN].  
This homogeneous conceptualisation of victims leaves out the victims' 
organisations with specific claims, such as those demanding land restitution 
and the imprisonment of their aggressors; or more complex readings where 
victims can also be perpetrators. Although victims' rights are named as the 
centre of the peace process, victims are not seen as proactive political actors 
with specific perspectives regarding the transitional justice agreements. 
Finally, the Government has portrayed itself as the expert in the field who 
have learned lessons from previous transitional justice experiences in 
Colombia, such as the Victims’ Law and the Peace and Justice Law. The 
official discourse uses technical rather than political language to justify political 
decisions that have material effects. For instance, based on some of the 
principles of TJ as a global project, Santos claimed that investigating all of the 
crimes that occurred during the conflict would be impossible and ineffective; 
therefor prioritizing, the most significant crimes and the highest ranking 
commanders.  He argued that it would be impossible and inefficient to have 
the same institutions in charge of prosecuting crimes and seeking the truth, and 
that the trials and Truth Commission should be two separate and independent 
mechanisms.  He insisted that the Commission must find “useful” truths rather 
than structural causes of conflict (Santos, 2018c: 116). 
 
Peace process opposition discourse  
Among the political opposition to the peace process with FARC, the 
Democratic Centre Party best represents the discourse of justice competing 
with that of the Government. The public debate among scholars, politicians, 
and analysts has been centred on the rhetorical strategies of the so-called ‘No’ 
campaigning from the 2016 plebiscite: the lies, distortions and the fear 
mongering that contributed to the success of the ‘No’ campaign and defeat of 
the peace accord plebiscite (Basset, 2018: 243). This research is focused on 
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how this particular oppositional discourse problematized justice in transition 
and the assumptions that informed it.  
In general, it could be said that it is a nationalistic discourse with a focus 
on the past. More specifically, the discourse focused on the perceived 
achievements of the Álvaro Uribe Vélez administration and its 'democratic 
security' policy. Its definition of justice in times of transition has three main 
characteristics: prioritisation of the 'rule of law' and the constitutional order, 
strong defence of the 'honourability' of members of the military, and a focus 
on retributive justice. Despite the political perspectives of this discourse, the 
critiques and their propositions are embedded in judiciary and technical 
debates that are difficult for those who are not familiar with the law or the field 
of political science to follow (Uprimny et al., 2014: 13). First, the idea that 
justice must be always framed in relation to the 'rule of law' and 
institutionalism, even in times of transition, results in only the State being ble 
to prosecute and administrate justice (Duque, 2017). Thus, justice is not 
relative, and the Special Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP) is consequently not lawful:  
with this agreement, justice has been relativised, based on the ideology of the 
perpetrators. Is there a difference in the Colombian law between a homicide 
perpetrated by the paramilitaries or committed by the FARC? Is there, in the 
Colombian law, any differentiation of a kidnapping committed by the FARC or 
by a paramilitary group? No, it does not exist, because in the rule of law 
enshrined in the Constitution there is no differentiation (Duque, 2017) 
[Translation by TN].  
According to this view, a new TJ system must therefore be part of the 
judiciary branch, meaning that its sentences would be under the supervision of 
the Supreme Court. The applicable law must be the Colombian constitution 
supported by international law, and all the judges must be Colombian nationals 
(Centro Democrático, 2016). According to Uribe, only the Attorney General 
Office should investigate and prosecute, and civil society and victims' 
organisations should not send reports to the JEP, as some of them are biased 
against military members and could endanger Colombia’s institutionalism 
(Uribe, 2016).  
This view relies on the assumption that the 'rule of law' and the State’s 
institutions work correctly, and, importantly, that the structure of the State was 
not involved in causing or reproducing violence. Uribe compared Colombia 
with other Latin American countries to remark that Colombia had not suffered 
under long-lasting dictatorships: “Our democracy has been permanently 
improving without having to give in to terrorism” (Uribe, 2016). Moreover, 
this view comes from a mainstream understanding of TJ as the transition to 
democracy or the implementation of the 'rule of law' (Sharp, 2014: 35).  
Secondly, the focus of the peace process is reduced to FARC 
demobilisation, meaning TJ would only be designed to prosecute guerrilla 
members. Legal regulations to pursue civilians and state agents already exist, 
and the President is not allowed to agree on a new judicial system to link them 
to criminal groups (Uribe, 2016). Civilians and state agents could only be part 
of a transitional justice process if they accepted it voluntarily. Military members 
that decided to take part in the TJ mechanisms would receive all of the legal 
benefits, and would also deserve different judicial treatment as any attempt to 
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treat them as equals of FARC members would be an insult to their honour. 
Therefore, justice must not apply the same chain of command for Armed 
Forces and FARC (Centro Democrático, 2016). This discourse is also a 
battlefield for the truth. According to Uribe, if FARC were to condition the 
justice system, they would impose a discourse wherein guerrillas are seen as 
political actors involved in a social struggle, while the State would be portrayed 
as the perpetrators (Uribe, 2016).  
Thirdly, prison sentences and restrictions on the liberties of high ranking 
guerrilla commandants are necessary parts of the 'rule of state' equilibrium, and 
provide exemplary ways to redress the victims (Duque, 2017). Not imprisoning 
or, extraditing FARC members and granting them political participation 
(guaranteed by the Peace Accords) provides a bad example for the rest of 
Colombia:  
This disguised amnesty is also granted without forgiveness, without repentance, 
without handing over the money of the third richest terrorist group in the world 
to redress the victims. The criminals admit the suffering caused and justify it 
(Uribe, 2016) [Translation by TN].  
The proponents of this view usually refer to some of the crimes more widely 
condemned by Colombians such as the rape of minors, forced abortions, and 
the kidnapping and killings of members of the state military.  
Both the Democratic Centre Party and the Government refer to the 
importance of international law, but use it as a counter-argument. According to 
Uribe, the Rome Statute allows for sentence reductions, but also demands 
retributive justice (Uribe, 2016). A peace agreement is thus a violation of 
international legal standards6. The anti-impunity approach, that has been 
promoted by legal scholars and activists around the world, justifies trials under 
a narrow assumption that legal processes are the best way to solve individual 
and social harm (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002: 584), and focuses on individual 
accountability, which ignores systemic responsibilities (Miller, 2008: 275). 
3.4 Civil society discourses 
To study some of the civil society discourses involved in the TJ debate during 
the peace negotiation process, I divided the analysis into victims, women's 
organisations, and representatives of ethnic communities. This decision was 
based on how they were included in the peace negotiations, with a full 
understanding that the mode of inclusion itself is something that can be 
debated.  
Unlike that of the Government,, there is no technical or neutral language 
in civil society’s discourses, and peace is conceptualized as a positive peace 
(Galtung, 1969) that includes social justice propositions to tackle structural 
                                                 
6 Article 77 of the Rome Statute states that imprisonment is necessarily part of the 
punishment the International Criminal Court may impose on a convicted person. This 
may be for a specified time or a life imprisonment. In addition, the Court might also 




violence. That is why, although most of the victims were invited to present the 
victims' rights perspectives, their demands included issues related land, 
education, and political participation, among other things. 
 
Victims 
Sixty individuals representing the victims were divided into five groups of 
twelve and invited to Havana. As it was explained earlier, these diverse groups 
were composed of external actors, and the conversations with the Government 
and FARC were conducted in secret. At the end of each meeting, the groups of 
victims released a concise statement containing no fully developed ideas on 
justice, peace and conflict. However, it could still be seen that their 
conceptualization of justice went further than retribution, and they claimed for 
justice “not as revenge, but as a right and a commitment to peace” (Segunda 
delegación víctimas, 2018), and found truth, the recognition of responsibilities, 
restitution of rights and the guarantees of non-repetition to be the issues of 
highest importance. Victims demanded a truth about what happened, but also 
a truth about both the causes of and the responsibilities in the war (Quinta 
delegación víctimas, 2018).  
They portrayed themselves as heterogeneous groups that did not pretend 
to represent the total number of victims within Colombia (Primera delegación 
víctimas, 2018). That heterogeneity is reflected by some of their specific 
demands. For instance, the only delegation that included a victim of anti-
personnel mines called for humanitarian demining processes (Cuarta 
delegación víctimas, 2018). Furthermore, the statement that includes a more 
profound conceptualization of structural violence was part of the fifth 
delegation that contained a significant number of politicians, black activists and 
victims of State violence (Quinta delegación víctimas, 2018).  
Thus, victims' claims during the peace process were more related to their 
positionality and their social struggles than to the condition of victimhood. 
Indeed, a study that analysed the data from the Justice and Peace Survey 
concluded that there were small differences between how victims and non-
victims felt about certain aspects of transitional justice, such as punishment, 
truth-seeking, historical memory, and reparations. Instead, differences 
depended on other factors such as religion (Nussio et al., 2015: 19). 
 
Women  
Women and feminists that were included in the Havana negotiations had clear 
message: Women had to be part of the peace agreement because their rights 
could not be agreed without their presence, and their inclusion was not to be 
restricted to the victims’ component of the peace negotiations, but instead to 
the whole Accord. Women' rights organisations participants defined 
themselves as the pluralistic voice of a wide variety of women, including: 
indigenous, peasant, feminist, LGBTI, victims, and ex-combatants, amongst 
others (Casa de la Mujer et al., 2014).  
According to them, the peace process, and by extension the TJ system, 
must acknowledge women and LGBTI people’s differential experiences of 
discrimination, exclusion, racism, and homophobia during the conflict. This 
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was specifically in relation to structural violence and the historical practices of 
patriarchy and militarism (Cumbre Mujeres y Paz, 2016), based on a system 
that reproduces an unequal distribution of land and resources based on gender 
(Casa de la Mujer et al., 2014). These demands have been largely ignored by the 
mainstream understandings of TJ, and only in the last years few have they been 
included in some programs. According to Nagy, when the disproportional 
impact of structural violence on women is ignored, women tend to appear as 
indirect or secondary victims of deceased family members (Nagy, 2008: 285).  
Consequently, women's organisations proposed a TJ mechanism that, in 
addition to the criminal justice component, assured that women and LGBTI 
people’s experiences would be addressed under a differential approach. 
Moreover, they demanded the recognition of the responsibilities of all actors 
involved in gender-based violence (Cumbre Mujeres y Paz, 2013: 63). 
Additionally, they demanded a balanced composition of men and women at 
the negotiating table, in the Special Jurisdiction of Peace, and in all of the 
institutions created in a post-agreement scenario. The main argument was that 
the presence of women would reduce the possibility that the TJ mechanism 
and the peacebuilding design would reproduce male subjectivity and interests, 
This claim has been further developed by feminist scholars (Ní Aoláin and 
Turner, 2007 in Céspedes-Báez and Ruiz, 2018: 104) 
One of the coalitions of women's rights NGOs pushed for the prohibition 
of amnesties for perpetrators of sexual violence against women (2018: 100). 
Some scholars and activists have pointed out the narrow understanding of 
women in conflict that came out as a result of these interventions:   
Women’s NGOs, movements, and advocates succeeded in including their voices 
in these points, but they ended up reinforcing an idea of women tied to 
victimhood and of sexual violence as the paradigmatic crime against women 
(Céspedes-Báez and Ruiz, 2018: 101). 
 
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities  
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities decided to join forces to 
demand the inclusion of ethnic perspectives in the peace agreement to 
acknowledge the self-determination of their communities, and their special 
rights granted by the Constitution. They primarily claimed a prior consultation 
with the ethnic communities to approve and implement the deal in their 
territories (Arias and Moreno, 2018). In the end, the Government and FARC 
also included them in the same category to include the so-called ethnic chapter 
in the final agreement. 
However, Afro-Colombians and indigenous people have different 
experiences of conflict, even within the same communities. The representation 
of the indigenous people in Havana was the National Indigenous Organization 
of Colombia (ONIC), an association that includes 47 regional indigenous 
organisations from 28 different departments with diverse experiences of the 
conflict and different understandings of peace and justice. An interesting 
example is the indigenous peoples of Cauca in the southwestern region of the 
country that has rejected the presence of FARC guerrillas in their territory 
since the 1980's. In addition to constant demands against the human rights 
33 
 
violations committed by the Armed Forces, they have claimed that FARC 
leadership has a systematic militarised strategy to affect the indigenous people 
in Cauca, their culture, and their territories (Aguilera, 2014: 312–316).   
Nonetheless, there is a common agenda that Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities brought to the negotiating table. In general, it can be 
said that they proposed an agreement and TJ mechanisms that acknowledged 
the violent structures of colonisation, discrimination, exclusion, and racism, 
which have had a disproportional impact on the ethnic communities (CONPA, 
2018: 477). Instead of an individualistic approach, Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous leaders asked for the recognition of collective and environmental 
victimisations (ONIC, 2016: 498).  Therefore, the reparations had to be seen in 
terms of social, economic and cultural rights (CONPI et al., 2016: 12). 
Moreover, there must be concertation for the DDR programs for indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian guerrilla members.  
The TJ mechanisms also had to consider the practices and customs of the 
ethnic groups, and attend to their pluralistic processes, languages, and 
traditional ways of transmission; and any JEP decision was to consider the 
principles of unity, territory, autonomy, and culture. Moreover, the 
mechanisms themselves had to include members of the indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities, and these communities’ reports had to be considered 
in the trials (CONPI et al., 2016: 9).   
Specifically, indigenous representatives demanded the recognition of the 
supremacy within their territories of Special Indigenous Justice (JEI in 
Spanish), a system “developed autonomously by the Government of each 
indigenous community and is ancestral, for life and harmony with Mother 
Earth” and entrenched in the Constitution (ONIC, 2016: 499). Their main 
concern was that the imposition of a new legal system would potentially 
undermine JEI's credibility. 
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4  Understanding peace and conflict 
The discourses discussed above on transitional justice relied on specific 
understandings of both the conflict and the peace process. These 
understandings are tied to the social locations and specific interests of the 
actors, and are indicative of the differences in future strategies for the post-
conflict reconstruction of the country.  
4.1 FARC discourse 
FARC recognises the existence of the conflict (or the war) and its narrative is 
strongly connected to the history of the last century in Colombia (Medina, 
2009). In that sense, in their speeches, there are reiterative references to 'La 
Violencia', the confrontation between the Colombian Conservative Party and 
the Liberal Party in the 1940s and 1950s, and to the anti-insurgency policies 
driven by the Government as part of a Cold War strategy.  Based on the 
analysis of the speeches, I argue that FARC’s understanding of conflict relies 
on three propositions that are the backbone of its conceptualisations of peace 
and justice. 
First, FARC argues that the origin of violence and its reproduction is 
structural, embedded in the political, economic, social and cultural structural 
conditions of domination, exploitation and inequality that still exist in 
Colombia (FARC-EP, 2018b: 243).The state, as the head of the dominant and 
exploitative regime, carries the main responsibility for the violence in 
Colombia. According to FARC, capitalism as the economic system is one of 
the structural causes of the conflict (Aguilera, 2014: 190). However, as a 
Government requirement, the change of socio-economic system was always 
off the table, and thus not present in FARC's proposal for the future 
transformation of the society.  
Those dominant structural power and social inequalities were the reasons 
why FARC decided to exercise the right of rebellion  (FARC-EP, 2018a: 244). 
Thus, the conflict did not start when the guerrilla group was created. 
Consequently, FARC understands peace as a positive peace (Galtung, 1969) in 
the sense that it is not limited to the end of the armed fighting but to the end 
of the structural violence. This means that changing the structural causes of the 
conflict is a condition to achieving peace: 
In the current political scenarios, all sides talk about “transition” and the kind of 
justice that we need to achieve it. But, moving up from the current condition to 
another implies necessarily to implement structural changes in the institutional 
framework that allow reconciliation based on social justice. So, then, it would be 
inconsistent to pretend that all the components of the distrusted institutions 
remain intact (FARC-EP, 2018a: 224) [Translation by TN]. 
The State is the first one called upon to reformulate itself towards the 
purpose of peace. FARC considers that the state and its institutions have 
designed and implemented terrorist policies that led to a false narrative of the 
conflict in which FARC is portrayed as the only victimizer in order to hide the 
State’s responsibilities in the conflict. 
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Second, according to FARC, the Colombian conflict has had multiple 
actors and they are just one among them. In that way, the guerrilla group does 
not limit its notion of conflict to the combatants in the battlefield but instead 
includes other actors such as political parties, companies, and corporate leaders 
in various economic sectors, landowners, transnational corporations, media 
outlets, the Church, and foreign powers, especially the United States. 
Therefore, to achieve peace all the actors need to tell the truth, and foreign 
powers have to cease any form of interventionism, advice or foreign military 
involvement (FARC-EP, 2018b: 161). The FARC considers that media and the 
Government have manipulated forgiveness discourse to reduce FARC to a 
machine of victimization (FARC-EP, 2018d: 161). 
Third, FARC defined itself as a political actor, implying that the political 
right to rebellion against the dominant power framed their actions during the 
conflict. The rebel group added that they were never defeated, thus the 
Colombian conflict has neither victors nor losers. Hence, peace is constantly 
defined as a political solution that requires political and social forgiveness to 
enable reconciliation. A peace scenario cannot be reproduced with this 
‘winners and losers’ logic, and that is why FARC is willing to work with other 
actors involved in the conflict to satisfy the rights of victims and affected 
communities in general (FARC-EP, 2018a: 229). 
4.2 Government discourses 
Santos Administration’s discourse 
According to the Government, Colombia needs peace to fulfil victims' rights 
as broadly as possible because peace is the supreme good of every society, and 
is a constitutional duty of the State. The Government is looking for a liberal 
peace that does not compromise the country’s neoliberal development model,  
nor the democratic institutional model, and does not represent a risk to the 
region (Doyle, 2005: 463). Furthermore, this is not a negative peace (Galtung, 
1969) because it is not limited to the “the silence of weapons” (El Tiempo, 
2016). But neither is it a positive peace, as it does not seek to change the 
structural violence. Rather, the Government understands the issues included in 
the agenda (i.e. agrarian development, political participation, drug trafficking) 
as reforms necessary to avoid the prolongation of the conflict, but not as the 
elements of the root causes of it.7  
The peace process is presented as a result of the Government’s plan that 
has meticulously followed, step by step, three chronological phases: the 
previous work that made an agreement possible, the agreement, and the 
transition. The argumentative structure of the Government’s discourses 
oversimplifies, or does not problematize the voices, facts and counter 
                                                 
7 Paraphrased from the non-published work. Navarrete, T (2018).  'What transition 
means? An argumentative and metaphorical analysis of the Colombian government 
discourse in the FARC peace agreement context'. 
36 
 
arguments that have played key roles in the peace process debates in 
Colombia.8   
 Unlike FARC, the Government discourse appeals to the future and to 
progress, and not to the past. 
A Colombia in peace will shine like a star on the international scene; a Colombia 
in peace will allow us to move forward faster towards equity; a Colombia in peace 
will facilitate us to become the most educated nation in Latin America; a 
Colombia in peace will be safer because the public force dedicated to war will 
focus on improving the security of citizens, of Colombians; a Colombia in peace 
will attract more investments that will create more and better jobs; a Colombia in 
peace will turn us into a tourist power; a Colombia in peace will take better care 
of the environment, of that wonderful biodiversity that we must preserve 
(Santos, 2018a: 515) [Translation by TN].  
The Government’s peace conceptualisation does not problematize to what 
extent the economic system; the development model, and the institutional 
structures have caused or exacerbated the conflict. The conflict is portrayed as 
an obstacle that needs to be torn down because it has slowed the economic 
progress in Colombia, and this is the reason why the State has not been able to 
fully guarantee rights to its citizens, especially in the most remote regions of 
the country. In this spirit, recognition of conflict was a practical decision to 
move forward. What kind of conflict the Government speaks of is a 50 year 
conflict that has left thousands of victims. This implies, without saying it 
directly, that the conflict started with the establishment of the FARC guerrilla 
group. Furthermore, the Government recognizes the FARC and ELN 
(National Liberation Army) guerrillas, some civilians and demobilized 
paramilitary groups as the main actors in the conflict. The State, mostly 
referring to certain state agents, has been seen as a participant, both actively 
and passively. Other illegal armed groups that appeared after the paramilitary 
demobilisation called, Bacrim (criminal bands) by the Government have been 
categorized as organised crime and not considered actors in the conflict. 
 
Peace process opposition discourse  
The Democratic Centre Party representatives have openly denied the existence 
of an internal conflict in Colombia. President of the Senate, Ernesto Macías 
said in his speech at Iván Duque's presidential inauguration on the August 7th 
2018: “In Colombia, there has not been a civil war or an armed conflict, but a 
terrorist threat against the State” (El Heraldo, 2018). Therefore, they do not 
recognise FARC as a political actor and, instead, portray them as terrorists (El 
Heraldo, 2018) a cocaine cartel (Duque, 2017) and the principal criminals 
of Colombian history (Uribe, 2016). On the other hand, the Armed Forces are 
described as protecting the sovereignty and providing security under the rule of 
law and civilians are represented as victims (Duque, 2017). 
 
                                                 
8 Paraphrased from the non-published work. Navarrete, T (2018).  'What transition 
means? An argumentative and metaphorical analysis of the Colombian government 
discourse in the FARC peace agreement context'. 
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It is a simplistic conceptualisation of the conflict focusing on FARC 
crimes. The State is portrayed as a victim and many other actors are ignored. 
There are no considerations for structural violence and the historical context 
are of secondary importance. According to Sharp (2014: 12), “when conflicts 
are viewed through a one-dimensional lens, prevention of human rights abuses 
becomes a simplistic function of punishment and impunity”.  
With that in mind, peace is conceptualised as a right in the Constitution 
that cannot be framed outside its legal boundaries. There will not be peace 
with impunity, which means, there will not be peace without punishment 
(Duque, 2017). Based on Government proposals, a peace agreement is limited 
to the achievement of a negative peace, to allow demobilisation and 
reintegration of the guerrilla members into the democracy. But there cannot be 
agreements on land distributions or political participation (Centro 
Democrático, 2016). It is also a liberal peace: “The only thing that guarantees a 
lasting peace is a respected and stable democracy, with great strength in private 
initiative and social policies” (Duque, 2017).  
Victims have the rights to truth, justice, and reparation. As part of the 
reparations, the Government propose a ‘winners and losers’ scenario in which 
FARC must be prosecuted, must redress the victims, ask for pardons, and 
must repent for their actions (Centro Democrático, 2016). However, there is 
no demand for an equal kind of reparation to the victims of the state, and 
Uribe’s administration did not demand the protection of victims' rights under 
the same conditions in the past, when the TJ mechanism to prosecute 
paramilitary members was created. 
4.3 Civil society discourses 
Victims 
According to victims groups’ public statements, truth is the basis for peace; a 
truth that can be constructed by listening to victims’ experiences (Segunda 
delegación víctimas, 2018). During the peace negotiation, victims wanted to be 
viewed as agents and not be recognized only by their suffering. One of them 
said: “We do not accept being the emotional touch in a negotiation” (Caracol 
Radio, 2014). Thus, as a group, victims demanded other actors not to 
instrumentalise their experiences (Segunda delegación víctimas, 2018) 
Victims call for a positive peace with specific social justice demands to 
address structural violence, such as access to education, health, essential 
sanitation services (Tercera delegación víctimas, 2018), and political inclusion 
(Quinta delegación víctimas, 2018). Regarding the conflict, victims list the 




Truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition guarantees are necessary 
conditions to end the conflict (Casa de la Mujer et al., 2014), but achieving 
peace implies a transformation of the structural causes that started the conflict 
and the recognition of the historical role women have in peacebuilding 
(Cumbre Mujeres y Paz, 2016). That is why women's organizations asked the 
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negotiating table to consider their propositions for all chapters of the 
agreements, and not only in the victims' rights section.   
The definition of structural causes includes a gender perspective. As 
Mujeres por la Paz concluded in their National Meeting of Women for Peace, 
“from the women's perspective, peacebuilding means a new way of doing 
politics, which implies decentralising power, eradicating historical, patriarchal 
and militaristic practices” (Cumbre Mujeres y Paz, 2016: 2).  Moreover, “Peace 
is the reflection of a fair, free, plural and egalitarian world” (Casa de la Mujer et 
al., 2014) [Translation by TN].  
There is not an extended conceptualisation of conflict in the public 
statements, but they remarked that violence and militarisation have had a 
disproportional impact on the lives of women and LGBTI people, and the 
importance of recognising the variety of actors that have participated in the 
conflict causing pain, marginalisation, and exclusion is of vital importance.   
 
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities  
According to the statements released by the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
representatives in Havana, ethnic and racial discrimination has been one of the 
root causes of the social and armed conflict. The ethnic groups, as they identify 
themselves, are victims of the racist and discriminatory practices of the state 
that deny them the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  
Consequently, indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have been 
particularly affected by the conflict (CONPA, 2018: 478). 
For them, land appropriation is central to understanding the conflict. Afro 
communities argue that after the expedition of the Law 70/1993, that 
conceded collective land titling to ancestral Afro-Colombian communities, the 
war increased in their territories through an extraction-based economic model 
that caused severe damage to the environment (Cortes-Ruiz, 2016: 13). 
Similarly, indigenous people consider that the war has been functional to an 
energy-mining colonization model of the ethnic communities and peasant 
territories. That it is a war in which FARC guerrilla has prioritised a militaristic 
strategy rather than a political agenda (ONIC, 2014: 118).   
For these reasons, most of the claims of ethnic communities were not 
focused on the victims' rights section or the Special Jurisdiction of Peace, but 
on other aspects of the peace agreement more related with the particular 
conditions of their communities, such as self-determination over their land, the 
expansion of coca crops in their territories, and illegal recruitment of the 
youngest members of their communities.  
In this way, social justice peace must be territorial, biodiverse and ethnic. 
Thus, it is a positive peace designed to solve the roots of the conflict (CONPI 
et al., 2016: 13) and to return to indigenous and Afro-Colombians the right to 
decide about a development model for their own territories (CONPA, 2018: 
479).  
For the indigenous representatives in Havana “peace means living in 
harmony with Mother Earth and its elements, including community life. It is 
the respect for our traditional and spiritual authorities, to the sacred sites, for 
the rivers and mountains, for the seas and oceans, for the forests and jungles, 
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animals and people” (ONIC, 2016: 501) [Translation by TN]. It is a concept of 




5 Discursive reflections on the Special Jurisdiction of  
Peace   
5.1 Transitional justice debate in the post-Peace Agreement 
context 
After Colombians rejected the agreement in the plebiscite of October 2016, 
FARC and Santos' government decided to re-negotiate the peace agreement 
with some of the political and religious leaders of the opposition, headed by 
the Democratic Centre Party, whose propositions mostly focused on the 
reformulation of the victims' rights point (FIP, 2016b). Although they did not 
reach a final arrangement, in November 2016 FARC and government 
announced a new peace agreement that included some of the propositions of 
the ‘No’ campaign. After that, the guerrillas started their transition from being 
a guerrilla group to becoming a political party (Casey, 2016).  
While Santos was still in power, some sections of this new agreement, 
including the creation of the JEP, were endorsed with significant changes by 
the Congress and ratified by the Constitutional Court. In the time after the 
agreement, more political voices of the opposition, and some from Santos 
Administration that had joined them9, were involved in defining what kind of 
justice would be implemented in Colombia after FARC demobilisation. At this 
point, the TJ deliberation and the final decisions about the mechanisms were 
considered amongst a centralised political elite. In O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 
words, it was a bargain between elites to determine the terms of the transition 
according to their interests (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986 in Paige, 2009: 
346). 
In January 2018, the Special Jurisdiction of Peace was inaugurated with the 
modifications included (Semana, 2018), but the debate about what its mission 
was is still ongoing, and the power relations in the Government changed. On 
July 17th 2018, Iván Duque, the candidate of the Democratic Centre that 
promised more modifications to the JEP, was elected as President (Casey and 
Abad, 2018).  
Thus, to analyse how the competing discourses are reflected in the Special 
Jurisdiction of Peace, this research is focused on four milestones that defined 
the Jurisdiction as it is today. 1) The first peace agreement of August 2016 
(Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016a) 2) The second peace 
agreement of November 2016 reached after the plebiscite (Gobierno de 
Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016b) 3) The Special Jurisdiction Peace Law 
Endorsed by the Government on April 2017 (Congreso de Colombia, 2017) 
and ratified by the Constitutional Court in November 2017 (Corte 
Constitucional, 2017) and 4) The later regulation to JEP in July 2018 
(Congreso de Colombia, 2018). 
 
                                                 
9 After the plebiscite, some parties from the Santos’ administration coalition, such as 
Cambio Radical, did not support the JEP and led the initiatives to re-formulate it. 
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5.2 Transition to what and justice for whom 
During these four moments, there were a variety of TJ aspects in dispute, but I 
focused the analysis on the following questions: transition to what end?  TJ to 
whom and how? And justice by whom and for whom?  
 
Transition to what end? 
The aim of the first peace agreement is the end the conflict and the 
construction of lasting peace (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016a: 
1). However, the Government and FARC made it clear that they have different 
expectations of what must be the final goal of the agreement, expectations that 
are informed by their conceptualisations of conflict and peace. Thus, according 
to the Government, the aim is to reverse the effects of conflict and change the 
conditions that have facilitated violence. For FARC, the purpose is to 
contribute to solving the structural causes of conflict, such as the lack of access 
to land (2016a: 1). A few pages later, the document of the agreement indicates 
that the end of the conflict means to start a transition that: 
contributes to a greater integration of our territories, a higher social inclusion - 
especially of those who have lived on the margins of development and have 
suffered the conflict - and to strengthen our democracy to expand it in all the 
national territory ensuring the discussion of social conflicts through institutional 
channels, with full guarantees for those who participate in politics (2016: 4) 
[Translation by TN]. 
Thus, the terms of the transition are familiar to the Governments' 
discourses on transitional justice and peace. It is a liberal peace perspective to 
promote democracy, or the expansion of the rule of law in the territory, and its 
inclusion in the neoliberal economic model of Colombia. The terms of the 
transition were not the centre of the discussion because these did not represent 
a threat to the interests of the armies, business and political elites. According to 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986 in Paige, 2009: 346), the main focus of elites 
bargaining on TJ was the legal-institutional reform, rather than socioeconomic 
transformations. Therefore, the bargain in Colombia has drawn towards the 
trials and the definition of who the perpetrators are and how they must be 
punished. The outcome is a Special Jurisdiction of Peace that does not threaten 
the status quo of the elite, based on the logic of “settling a past account, 
without upsetting a present transition” (2009: 347) 
 
TJ to whom and how?  
The first Peace Accord determined that the JEP would investigate and prosecute 
all actors (i.e. ex-combatants, military members, civilians, and state agents), 
who had direct or indirect participation in the conflict, including the civilians 
who sponsored, not through coercion and threats, paramilitary groups 
(Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016a: 134). The document excluded 
from this procedure the President and former Presidents and paramilitary 
members that already went through the Peace and Justice Law trials.  
Following the Rome Statute, international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, the agreement forbids amnesties to crimes 
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against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, including sexual violence, focusing 
on the most significant crimes and the higher ranked commanders (2016: 136).  
FARC ex-combatants that accept their responsibility, tell the truth, and 
compensate the victims through social service work, receive liberty-restricted 
sanctions, not imprisonment, from five to eight years, without losing their 
political rights (2016: 297). In this scenario, military commanders must take 
responsibility for the crimes committed by their subalterns, even if they did not 
take an active role in the actions, but rather through negligence (Pabon and De 
Gamboa, 2018: 79).   
The second agreement extended the sanctions benefits to the state agents and 
civilians but made clear that telling the truth does not mean to accept any 
responsibility (Equipo Negociador del Gobierno, 2018: 257).  It also limited 
the liberty-restriction sanction to FARC members to specific locations and 
urged that FARC economic reparation to the victims be a requisite (OACP, 
2018: 240). The condition of reparations does not apply to other actors. As 
Miller explains (2008: 284), the focus on reparation in the mainstream TJ 
approach contributes to the definition of who is guilty and who is the victim. 
When reparation is compensation and not a redistribution of wealth, the 
debates are narrowed to who ‘owes’ whom and how.   
The Special Jurisdiction of Peace's Law issued by the Congress went further 
and determined that the participation of civilians - the so-called third-parties in 
the conflict - and civil servants in the Special Jurisdiction of Peace would be 
only voluntary (Congreso de Colombia, 2017: 14). The decision was confirmed 
by the Constitutional Court on the basis that JEP is a mechanism to end the 
conflict and reincorporate FARC members into civilian life Therefore,  forcing 
non-combatants to join the new jurisdiction is unconstitutional (Corte 
Constitucional, 2017: 20–21). It is an interpretation that relies on a simplified 
assumption of conflict as a confrontation between combatants on the 
battlefield. Furthermore, Congress excluded from the scope of the JEP the 
funders of illegal armed groups and limited it to the so-called physical crimes 
included in the Rome Statute (Congreso de Colombia, 2017: 17). The Congress 
also narrowed the understanding of the command chain responsibility; military 
commanders, but not civilians, must be investigated only in cases where they 
had explicit and effective knowledge about the crimes (2017: 28).10  
                                                 
10 Pursuant to Article 28 of the ICC's statute, commanders and other superiors (non-
military) may be deemed to be responsible for the crimes committed by subordinates 
under her effective authority and control when she failed to control them and to take 
all the necessary measures to prevent the commission of the crime. The treatment of 
the military commanders’ and civilian superiors' responsibility differs slightly. Both are 
responsible if they know, or should have known about their subordinates’ acts, and if 
they did not take preventive measures to avoid the crime and punish the subordinates. 
However, in the case of civilian superiors, they end up being responsible when ‘ The 
crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of 
the superior’ (ICC, 2002: 19). 
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Lastly, during the Law’s regulation, among other modifications, the 
Congress called for a special procedure and chamber in the JEP for the 
prosecution of military members. Until this is completed, they are not obliged 
to be part of the JEP (Congreso de Colombia, 2018: 34).  
To summarize, after the modifications, JEP prosecutions are only 
mandatory for FARC combatants and military members, but not under the 
same conditions, meaning that there is not equal access to justice for all 
victims. Therefore, it could be said that the limitations of the scope of the 
Special Jurisdiction of Peace ended up narrowing the transition discourse into a 
demobilisation process and framed the discussion as a one-dimensional 
understanding of the Colombian conflict as a fight between combatants.   
 
Justice by whom and for whom? 
The discussion of who is prosecuting whom is connected with the reasons to 
diminish the scope of the Special Jurisdiction of Peace, while the debate about 
victims' rights has been secondary. However, the outcome of the TJ bargain 
occurred at the expense of civil society demands. 
The first peace agreement established that JEP would be formed by national 
and foreign judges with independence from the judicial branch and full 
authority to investigate and prosecute any human rights violation related to the 
conflict (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016a: 130). As the 
Government advised and according to TJ traditional set of mechanisms, it 
created a Truth Commission in charge of clarifying violence patterns, context, 
and regional dynamics in which the human rights violations occurred. 
However, the information consigned by the Commission cannot be part of the 
judicial process of the Special Jurisdiction of Peace.  
As it has been defined in past TJ legal frameworks in Colombia, 
international law standards determine who is a victim and who is not, as well as 
the definition of victims’ rights in terms of truth, justice, reparation and non-
repetition. But, following the suggestions of the civil society groups in Havana, 
there is a differential approach recognisant of the disproportional impact of the 
conflict on women, LGBT communities, indigenous people, and Afro-
Colombians. The agreement also ratified that any JEP decision concerning the 
Special Indigenous Jurisdiction needs to be previously consulted with them. 
Moreover, the reports presented by civil society and victims' organisations to 
the JEP had the same importance as the authority’s reports (2016a: 149–151).  
After the plebiscite, the second agreement established a 15-year temporal limit 
to JEP, eliminated the direct presence of foreign judges and created an appeal 
procedure and determined that its sentences would be under the vigilance of 
the Supreme Court (Equipo Negociador del Gobierno, 2018: 240–253), in 
accordance with the claims of the Democratic Centre Party.  
Despite what civil society representation in Havana demanded, the role of 
victims changed under this new agreement and their representation was 
focused more on their suffering instead of their political agency. The civil 
society and victims’ organisations' reports presented to the JEP lost the power 
to start an investigation and their presence is only required in ‘contradictory 
trials’ (Equipo Negociador del Gobierno, 2018: 252).  
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Furthermore, following the suggestions of the evangelical churches and 
the Conservative Party (FIP, 2016b), the gender approach in the agreement 
was modified because of the argument that the so-called 'gender ideology' was 
a threat to the traditional family values (Chaparro and Martínez, 2017: 12). 
Thus, in the second agreement signed by the Government and the FARC, any 
mention to the gender equity was changed to "equity between men and 
women" (Equipo Negociador del Gobierno, 2018: 274); eliminating all the 
allusions to the LGBTI population. It is evident that the transgressive gender-
role perspectives are still perceived as hazardous to the status quo (Chaparro 
and Martínez, 2017: 13). 
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6  Conclusions 
The key actors selected for this research paper have different definitions and 
expectations of justice in transition that are tied to their social positions as well 
as their specific interests. On the one hand, FARC understands justice as social 
justice that requires, among other things, a truth-unveiling process for all actors 
involved in the conflict. On the other hand, for the civil society representatives 
in Havana, any attempt at justice needed to start with the recognition of the 
unequal, racist, and discriminatory structures that have had a disproportional 
impact on some civil society sectors based on class, race, gender, and location. 
Meanwhile, the Governments' competing discourses include a set of 
mechanisms driven the international legal standards to end the conflict, and a 
more retributive justice approach represented by a ‘winners and losers’ trials 
scenario.   
The discourses on transitional justice rely on specific understandings of 
both the conflict and the peace. On one side, FARC sees peace in a positive 
way as social justice, thus to achieve it, it is necessary to end the structural 
conditions of inequality and domination that caused the violence; in another 
positive sense, for civil society representatives peace means tackling social 
inequality and the inclusion of plural discourses. On the other side, the 
Government's competing discourses coincide with a liberal conceptualisation 
that focuses on crimes against humanity, rather than structural violence, while 
the conflict is considered an obstacle by the former administration, and a 
terrorist threat by the current Government. 
After the peace accord was signed by the parties and rejected in the 
plebiscite, the definitions of Special Jurisdiction of Peace and the terms of the 
transition have been parts of a bargain between elites looking to preserve the 
status quo. The outcome so far has privileged the Government's discourses, 
especially those of the government in power, while ignoring some of the 
demands made by civil society representatives and FARC. Thus, the terms of 
the transition are still driven by a liberal peace project; justice has been reduced 
to a ‘winners and losers’ scenario resulting in trials to prosecute combatants; 
and more benefits for the Armed Forces. The peace conceptualisation has 
been narrowed to a more negative sense that prioritises the demobilisation and 
prosecution of FARC and some military members; and the understanding of 
conflict has been simplified to a unidimensional perspective of the battlefield 
in which state forces face an insurgency group.   
In a broader sense, the post-structural discourse analysis of this research 
and the critical theoretical perspectives on TJ, contribute to unpacking the 
assumption of TJ as a set of neutral or pragmatic mechanisms to deal with a 
violent past. It allows for a broader understanding of TJ as a particular 
'solution' to deal with a particular representation of the problem. The analysis 
also indicates that the discourses of justice in transition are embedded in 
particular understandings of peace and conflict informed by the assumptions, 
presumptions, social positioning, and specific interests of the actors involved. 
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Finally, this research contributes to a broader analysis of TJ discussions in 
Colombia, framed outside the box of the legal boundaries. This technique is 
key to further examinations of how peace and conflict discourses embedded in 
the TJ mechanisms are shaping strategies for post-conflict reconstruction, and 
to some extent defining the future of the country. 
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Appendix 1 - WPR question guiding 
1 What’s the problem represented to be? 
2 What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation 
of the problem? 
3 How has this representation of the problem come about? 
4 What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where 
are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? 
5 What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? 
6 How / where is this representation of the problem produced, 
disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, 
disputed and disrupted? 
 
 
Appendix 2 - Documents for analysis  
FARC 
- 05-08-2013 Statement of the FARC-EP Peace Delegation. The  
historical responsibility of violence: implications of recognition of State 
as part of the conflict, the right to peace and importance of historical 
memory P. 160 – 161 (Volume III)  
 
- 03-09-2014 Statement of the FARC-EP Peace Delegation.  
Comprehensive rights of victims for peace and national reconciliation: 
ten elementary proposals. Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP. 
P. 224-226, 229 – 231, 234 – 236, 290 – 292 (Volume V Part I)   
 
- 15-12-2015 Statement of the FARC-EP Peace Delegation. Message to 
the Colombian people about the final closure of the Special Jurisdiction 
for Peace and the Partial Agreement about Victims. The benefits of the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace and its implications regarding impunity 
and justice. Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP. P. 522 – 527 





Santos’ administration  
- 25-07-2013 Declaration of Juan Manuel Santos. Public Hearing  
Intervention of the Legal Framework for Peace. Foundations and  
details of the Legal Framework for Peace: no impunity,  
comprehensiveness and conditionality, among other aspects. Library of 
the Peace Process with the FARC-EP. P. 137 – 145. (Volume III)  
 
- 23-07-2014 Declaration of Juan Manuel Santos. Intervention in the 
‘Culture of Peace and transitional justice’ Forum. Considerations on 
victims, justice and truth commissions, and their importance in the 
Peace Process scenario Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP. P. 
112 – 117 (Volume V Part I) 
 
- 23-09-2015 Declaration of Juan Manuel Santos. Agreement and justice 
issues in the Peace Process with the FARC-EP.  The definition of date 
to sign the Final Agreement, the Agreement on the bases of a justice 
system and the importance to think of a Colombia without conflict.  
Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP. P. 514 – 519 (Volume V 
Part II)   
Democratic Centre Party  
- 26-09-2016 Manuscript of Álvaro Uribe regarding the peace Agreement 
published by newspaper El Colombiano the day that the First peace 
agreement was signed. 
http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/acuerdos-de-gobierno-y-
farc/acuerdo-de-paz-manuscrito-de-alvaro-uribe-DF5052072 
- 2016 Bases of a national peace agreement. Democratic Centre Party 
proposals to re-negotiate the agreement after the plebiscite. 
http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/bases-de-un-
acuerdo-nacional-de-paz.pdf 
- 06-04-2017 Senator Iván Duque's intervention in the public hearing 










- 16-08-2014 First delegation of Victims. Release. Words of thanks to 
the Bureau and ratification of the commitment of the victims to build 
peace. P. 92 -93 (Volume V Part I). 
- 10-09-2014. Second delegation of victims. Release. Gratitude of victims 
for peace efforts and the invitation to meet with the Mesa, and demand 
that the parties guarantee their rights. Library of the Peace Process with the 
FARC-EP.  P. 126 (Volume V Part I). 
- 02-10-2014 Third Delegation of Victims. Release. Recount of the  
symbolic act offered, expressions of support for the Process and rejec-
tion of the threats and stigmatization of those that have been the object 
of the victims who have met with the Mesa. Library of the Peace Process 
with the FARC-EP, P. 151 -152 (Volume V Part I). 
- 02-11-2014 Fourth Delegation of Victims. Release. Recount of the 
eight considerations expressed by the victims, regarding the Peace Pro-
cess. Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP. P. 182 -183 (Volume 
V Part I). 
- 16-12-2014 Fifth Delegation of Victims. Release. Count of the calls to 
advance in the Process, to listen to the communities most affected by 
the conflict and to promote the necessary mechanisms to build peace. 
Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP.  P. 217 (Volume V Part I). 
Women’s rights organisations  
- 25-10-2013 First National summit women and peace: proposals 
systematization. Organizations: Casa de la Mujer, Ruta Pacífica de las 
Mujeres, Red Nacional de Mujeres, Mujeres por la paz, Colectivo de 
Pensamiento y Acción Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad, Grupo de 
Seguimiento de la Resolución 1325, Conferencia Nacional de 
Organizaciones Afrocolombianas – CNOA –, Iniciativa de Mujeres 
Colombianas por la Paz – IMP – y la Asociación Nacional de Mujeres 
Campesinas, Negras e Indígenas de Colombia – ANMUCIC 
http://cumbrenacionaldemujeresypaz.com/sistematizacion/ 
- 15-12-2014 Statement: Women's organizations to be part of the peace 
agreement and not pact their rights without them. Organizations: The 
House of Women, Women for Peace, with its delegate ASODEMUC; 
Mujeres Arte y Parte en la Paz of Colombia, with its delegate the 
Colombian Theater Corporation, and the Women for Peace Summit, 
with its delegates Peaceful Route for Women, National Network of 
Women and Alliance Initiatives of Colombian Women for Peace -IMP. 
https://www.humanas.org.co/archivos/63a.pdf 
 
- 21-09-2016 Second National summit women and peace: Political 
manifesto. Organizations: Casa de la Mujer, Ruta Pacífica de las 
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Mujeres, Red Nacional de Mujeres, Mujeres por la paz, Colectivo de 
Pensamiento y Acción Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad, Grupo de 
Seguimiento de la Resolución 1325, Conferencia Nacional de 
Organizaciones Afrocolombianas – CNOA –, Iniciativa de Mujeres 
Colombianas por la Paz – IMP – y la Asociación Nacional de Mujeres 
Campesinas, Negras e Indígenas de Colombia – ANMUCIC 
http://cumbrenacionaldemujeresypaz.com/encuentros-
nacionales/2da-cumbre-2016/ 
Afro-Colombians and Indigenous people  
- 28-06-2016 Statement of the National Indigenous Organization of 
Colombia (ONIC). Meeting with the negotiation teams in Havana and 
the representatives of indigenous peoples, their idea of peace and the 
requirement to be present in the Final Agreement. Library of the Peace 
Process with the FARC-EP. P. 498 – 501 (Volume VII)  
- 8-01-2016 Stament of the Afro-Colombian Peace National Council 
(CONPA). Facing the advances in the Negotiations between the 
Government and the FARC-EP, we are still waiting for an answer. 
Claim by the Afro-Colombian community to the negotiation table 
demanding participation in the Peace Negotiations. Library of the Peace 
Process with the FARC-EP.  P. 476- 479 (Volume VII) 
- 2016 Joint proposal of six indigenous and afro organizations: 
CONAFRO, CONPI, MASEAQCH, FEDEMICHOCÓ PODER 
CIUDADANO, CONPAZ. Proposals for Inter-ethnic Peace 
dialogues. Analysis and Territorial Ethnic Approach of the Peace 
conversation in Havana Cuba. http://jafethpaz.com/propuesta-
interetnica-de-dialogos-de-paz/ 
*Library of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP   
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Prensa/Paginas/2018/
Biblioteca-del-Proceso-de-Paz-con-las-Farc-EP.aspx  
 
